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Abstract. This paper analyzes the structure of cooperation between two large countries under one-
sided incomplete information. Foreign government privately observes its likelihood of 
experiencing a political economy shock in each period. Home government’s prior belief about this 
likelihood is updated in a Bayesian fashion as the relationship continues. We show that the home 
government employs its privilege to design a contract so as to start with a few-goods-agreement, 
and increase the extent of cooperation gradually as its belief is favorably updated through periods. 
We also provide the conditions under which the home government makes the partner reveal its 
type in the beginning, or enables it to stay in a cooperative relationship without a complete 
revelation. As opposed to conventional approaches that relate gradualism with cost of 
liberalization, we show that asymmetric information provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to 
emerge.  
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1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization does not occur overnight. A series of bilateral and multilateral agreements have gradually 
reduced the average tariff rate from 18% in Europe and 15% in North America in the late 1950s to 4% in the North 
Atlantic nations by the end of 20th century (Baldwin, 2006). Gradualism in free trade agreements, however, is not 
limited to tariff reductions. A noteworthy aspect of the transition from protectionist trade policies to freer trade is the 
gradually increasing scope of liberalization. Trading partners might prefer starting with a few-goods-agreement, and 
gradually transform it to a more comprehensive one under favorable circumstances.  
Historically, one can observe that sector-based gradualism has been manifested in multilateral, bilateral, and 
regional forms. New tariff concessions under the GATT terms were negotiated on a product-by-product basis in 
Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956) and Dillon (1960-61) rounds. Almost two decades 
after the initial negotiations for the GATT negotiators expanded the method to an industry/sector-wide schedule for 
the first time in the Kennedy Round of 1962-67. The European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the US-
Canada Auto Pact (1965) are other well known cases which prepared the ground for further cooperation between 
signatory governments. Yet, not all sector-specific agreements are designed to evolve into broad cooperation 
schemes. More recently, the US government negotiated sector-specific agreements on “zero-for-zero” basis. 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) was developed in 1996 and followed by Financial Services Agreement 
(FSA) in 1997. Following the success of the former agreement, APEC ministers negotiated nine additional sectors in 
Vancouver in 1997, which failed due to the objections of Japan and other Asian countries. The most important 
difference between the agreements with a gradually increasing scope and the recent zero-for-zero sector-based 
agreements arises in dispute settlement procedure. The former type of agreement denotes a body of linked issues 
with relatively flexible cross-retaliation prospects; whereas the latter one defines a series of unlinked issues with 
very limited cross-retaliation possibilities.  This paper examines gradualism in free trade agreements in the 
framework of linked agreements. More specifically, we investigate the mechanism behind the gradual increments in 
the number of issues linked to the original body. Why do countries prefer starting an agreement with a few sectors 
rather than settling with the optimal scope at the outset of an agreement? Under which conditions does the initial 
agreement with limited scope provide further cooperation later on?  
This paper proposes an answer for these questions within a stylized perspective. Unilaterally optimal trade policies 
harm trading partners through terms-of-trade externalities. Reciprocal concessions in otherwise selfishly 
commanded trade, therefore, provide gains for both countries in a long term relationship. We show, however, that 
the presence of asymmetric information regarding the partner’s incentive to betray in the future impedes full 
cooperation in early stages of the relationship. Governments prefer “starting small” in an uncertain environment in 
order to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal. Learning about trading partner’s incentive structure enhances 
expectations and encourages governments to increase their current level of cooperation. More specifically, the 
uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being “good” is improved as the partner 
cooperates under a self-enforcing agreement. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future 
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betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. Learning, therefore, is the mechanism that provides gradualism in 
our model. 
To assess the evolution of cooperation we develop a simple model in which two large countries produce and trade a 
continuum of goods. Although we assume that countries are symmetric in both demand and supply conditions, there 
are two important asymmetries: the presence of one-sided incomplete information and the privilege of uninformed 
government to propose a contract. Foreign government privately observes its dynamically stochastic political 
economy concerns. It may experience political economy shocks in the form of protectionist bias for its import 
competing sectors. Home government proposes a contract using its subjective belief, in response, since it cannot 
observe the actual probability of a shock. Therefore, the model suggests a case where a “weak” (foreign) country 
requests access to a free trade agreement and the “strong” country (home or a customs union) proposes the terms of 
the agreement, specifically the scope of the agreement. Some typical examples for these “new regionalist” 
agreements (Ethier, 1998) are Mexico’s accession to NAFTA, EU’s enlargement in Eastern Europe, and free trade 
agreements between US and others2 which prevail or are proposed.  
Our analysis builds on a recursive structure that emerges from an infinitely repeated interaction. We define the type 
of the foreign government on the basis of its likelihood of experiencing a political economy shock. By choice of 
parameters, if the probability of that shock is high enough (type-2), then the foreign government betrays by choosing 
unilaterally optimal tariffs whenever that shock is realized. On the other hand, it cooperates even when the shock 
occurs if the probability is low enough (type-1). In the absence of informational asymmetry, where the type of 
foreign government is common knowledge, governments cooperate at a maximum level starting with the first period 
if they are patient enough given the probability of a shock. Cooperation when the type of foreign government is not 
observed by the home government is, however, more cumbersome. Home government’s prior belief about the 
foreign government’s type is updated in a Bayesian fashion upon observing foreign government’s action in each 
period. Therefore, an agreement should take any additional information revealed in the course of a relationship into 
consideration. One way to do this is assuming that the long-term relationship is run by a sequence of short-term 
contracts. Alternatively, the initial agreement can be designed so as to avoid reneging without loss of generality (see 
Laffont and Tirole, 1990).  We follow the second option. 
We specify two classes of equilibrium in asymmetric information environment. In a pooling equilibrium, both types 
of foreign government cooperate perpetually as long as no shock is observed. Only a type-2 foreign government 
betrays whenever a shock is realized. We show that the home government proposes increasing the cooperation 
gradually, conditional on the cooperative action of foreign government in equilibrium. Eventually the cooperation 
level reaches the maximum and stays stationary afterwards unless betrayal is observed. In a separating equilibrium, 
on the other hand, probability of political economy shock for a type-2 foreign government is high enough that it 
betrays, even before a shock is realized, when the cooperation is stationary. Home government needs to provide 
sufficient intertemporal incentives to keep type-2 foreign government in a cooperative relationship. This comprises 
                                                            
2 These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, Singapore, Panama, Peru and 
Oman. 
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our version of the well known “Bicycle Theory,” which was discussed by Bhagwati (1988). A failure to provide 
further liberalization ends up bringing cooperation to an end.  However, “pedaling” cannot be sustained forever in 
our model since the level of cooperation is bounded above by the number of goods. Therefore, cooperation with a 
“bad” partner is dissolved eventually once the countries deplete their liberalization prospects, if not before. Yet the 
dissolution of partnership through the separation of types is also non-trivial due to the “ratchet effect.”  After the 
foreign government is revealed to be type-1, the home government optimally proposes maximum cooperation for the 
rest of the relationship. However, foreseeing this jump in cooperation level, type-2 foreign government postpones 
the betrayal one period to get a higher deviation payoff in maximum cooperation stage. We show that when the 
home government is optimistic enough about the foreign government’s type, it prefers “testing” the foreign 
government in the beginning of their relationship by proposing a high cooperation level.  An interesting implication 
is that the more patient that an uninformed government is, the more likely it resolves the uncertainty in the 
beginning of relationship by “testing” its partner.  
The literature on gradualism in trade agreements extensively utilizes a non-stationary economic environment as the 
source of dynamic adjustment in tariffs. Staiger (1995) formalizes gradual tariff reduction in a self-enforcing trade 
agreement framework. Existence of import competing sector workers with sector-specific skills provides rent-
generating potential of tariff hikes. Liberalization relocates a portion of these workers. Once a worker is relocated 
from the import competing sector, she loses her sector-specific skill with a given probability, which yields a non-
stationary environment. As the supply of workers with sector specific skills shrinks, high tariffs become less 
desirable and the sustainable cooperative tariff drops. Therefore, initial progress in trade liberalization enables 
further liberalization in the future. Similarly, Furusawa and Lai (1999) shows that gradualism emerges when 
adjustment costs arise due to labor mobility between sectors. Chisik (2003) explicitly recognizes the non-stationary 
aspect of trading environment. In his paper, specialization and development of partner specific capital decreases the 
most cooperative tariff within time. A small tariff reduction provides further accumulation of capital in the export 
sector with a certain degree of irreversibility, which in turn increases both the benefit of continuing the liberalization 
and cost of a tariff war. Chisik (2009) analyzes multi-sector free trade agreements with an emphasis on dynamic 
changes in the scope of linked agreements and the emergence of zero-for-zero agreements. Linking agreements 
provide further liberalization in the presence of irreversible partner specific costs and perfectly correlated noise 
across sectors. As the correlation decreases, however, liberalization becomes more enforceable in some sectors in an 
unlinked agreement. The paper also shows that unlinked agreements will eventually be pursued as the body of 
linked agreements matures. In Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), frictions in capital mobility and lobbying lead to 
gradualism.  
As opposed to previous literature, Bond and Park (2002) formalize a case where the gradualism result does not 
depend on evolution of a state variable. Given asymmetric country sizes, liberalization exhibits a non-stationary 
pattern due to desire of the small country to smooth consumption over time. As the non-stationary and efficient trade 
agreement promises rising payoffs to the small country, most cooperative tariffs are reduced over time through 
relaxation in its incentive constraint, which is the binding one. Conconi and Perroni (2004) also focus on asymmetric 
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country size as a source of dynamic change in degree of liberalization, however with an emphasis on commitment 
issues in small countries. Finally, Zissimos (2007) investigates the impact of GATT dispute settlement procedure 
(specifically Article XXIII) on gradual liberalization.  
Our work differs from the first group of literature in the sense that we show gradualism can emerge without 
adjustment costs. Similar to Bond and Park (2002), economic environment is stationary in our model. However, 
unlike the second group of literature, we do not use asymmetries between economies. Hence, our result of 
gradualism is robust to changes in economic environment. Game theoretic technique employed in this paper is 
similar to a long term partnership model with two-sided incomplete information developed in Watson (1999) and 
Watson (2002). Formalizing dynamic games with variable stakes and two types of players, the latter work describes 
the equilibrium regimes where different types of players separate in the beginning since a certain type of player 1 
deviates, and level of cooperation rises gradually then after, under commitment. The former paper models 
cooperation under renegotiation condition and shows a quick separation phase followed by a gradual cooperation 
one. Furusawa and Kawakami (2006) shows that gradualism arises in a two sided incomplete information game with 
variable stakes and outside options. In this paper we characterize a long term relationship with one-sided incomplete 
information and Prisoner’s Dilemma type payoff structure. A major difference that brings our problem close to a 
screening framework is hierarchical relationship between players, i.e. home government has privilege to design the 
contract. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section describes the basic economic environment and trade relationship 
between countries. We solve for a complete information optimal cooperation model as a benchmark case. Section 3 
introduces asymmetric information into the model. We derive incentive constraints in a self-enforcing trade 
agreement and define incentive feasible cooperation with respect to different types of the foreign government and 
the optimal cooperation with respect to the home government. The last section concludes. Proofs are contained in 
the appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
In this section, we present the characteristics of our basic model of trade between two large countries. We start by 
defining the structure of trade within a simple framework; we introduce an optimal agreement model with complete 
information where the home government, observing conditions in the foreign country, proposes an incentive 
compatible contract that maximizes its expected welfare.  
2.1. Basic Set Up 
We consider a two country partial equilibrium model where both countries produce goods in a continuous interval [0,𝑛𝑛]. We assume that demand functions are identical across goods and countries: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗) = 𝐴𝐴 −
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
∗, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,𝑛𝑛], where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ denote the local prices of good 𝑖𝑖 in the home and foreign countries. All goods in the 
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model are produced in both countries, however have different supplies: 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖   and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗. The 
corresponding home and foreign country export supply and import demand functions are then: 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) −
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖), 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 � = 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 �, 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗∗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗∗� = 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗∗� − 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗∗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗∗�, and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖∗(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗) = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗) − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗), respectively. We assume 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑎𝑎 , and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎, ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,  𝑛𝑛/2),   𝑗𝑗 ∈ (𝑛𝑛/2,  𝑛𝑛]    , where 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑎𝑎. It is immediate that the home country 
exports in the region [0,  𝑛𝑛/2)  , and imports in the region (𝑛𝑛/2,  𝑛𝑛] . We will denote the former interval as export 
sector, and the latter one as import sector for the home country. Countries, therefore, have identical supplies of 
goods within a specific sector, and they are symmetric; i.e. the supplies of home export goods and foreign exports 
goods are identical. 
Each government imposes a specific import tariff, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗  and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖∗ on their importable goods. Importers pay the world 
price of an imported good and the specific import tariff, whereas exporters of that good get only the world price 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
𝑤𝑤�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗  and 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � = 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗∗�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 �, where asterisk denotes foreign value. In the presence of non-prohibitive 
tariffs market clearing conditions provide the equilibrium world and local prices. Solving 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗  � = 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗∗�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤� we 
get the equilibrium prices 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � and 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � with explicit solutions: 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � = 2𝐴𝐴−𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 �1+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 �2+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∗ , and 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � = 2𝐴𝐴+𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 �1+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∗�2+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∗ .  
The prices of foreign country import goods are found analogously. 
Following the convention, we assume that each government maximizes a social welfare function composed of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenues from import goods. Formally, social welfare on a single 
exportable good in the home country is given by: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤) = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤)𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤
                                                               (2.1) 
Welfare generated by a single importable good in the home country is: 
𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗�𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 ,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤� = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 = �𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 �𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 �𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 � + �𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤�𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 �𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗 �                                     (2.2) 
We define the aggregate welfare in home country as the sum of welfares generated by individual export and import 
goods: 𝑤𝑤(. ) ≡ ∫ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + ∫ 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=0 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗. As opposed to the home government, we assume that foreign government faces 
political economy considerations in import competing goods. This is represented by identical weight parameters, 𝛾𝛾, 
assigned to producer surpluses of respective goods imported by the foreign country. Formally, the foreign country 
welfare on an importable good is, then: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
∗�𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖
∗,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤� = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ = � 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗)𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖∗�𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖∗� + �𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖∗�𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖∗�                             (2.3) 
Foreign country political-economy parameter 𝛾𝛾 is drawn from a discrete set of possible values  Γ ≡ {𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 , 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻} in each 
period, where 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿  and 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻  denote the low and high values of 𝛾𝛾 respectively. Therefore, we associate a “state of 
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nature” with the realized political-economy parameter: A high (low) state denotes the realization of a high (low) 
political economy parameter in an arbitrary period. On the other hand, the “type” of foreign government is defined 
with respect to the probability of getting low state of nature in each period. A type-1 (good type) foreign government 
has probability  𝑝𝑝1 of getting a low state of nature (good state) in a given period, whereas a type-2 (bad type) foreign 
government’s likelihood is defined with 𝑝𝑝2, where 0 < 𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝1 < 1. The type of foreign government is determined 
by nature beforehand and is fixed throughout the game as opposed to state of nature. 
 In the absence of a trade agreement, governments apply Nash tariffs in importable goods, which unilaterally 
maximize their own welfares, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁 ≡ arg max𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 � and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾) ≡ arg max𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖∗(𝛾𝛾), 𝛾𝛾). Using the first order 
conditions one can show that the foreign country Nash tariff is increasing in its political economy parameter. Due to 
the identical demand and supply structures, unilaterally optimal tariffs and therefore welfares on goods in the same 
sector are equal. This enables us remove subscripts that denote different goods in the same sector. With no 
cooperative agreement the relationship between the trade partners exhibits characteristics of a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Each country’s welfare is increasing in its own tariff but is decreasing in partner’s tariff due to 
terms-of-trade deterioration. Jointly efficient tariffs maximize the world welfare, but are undermined by unilateral 
incentives to deviate.  
A trade agreement specifies a sequence of cooperative tariffs (𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 , 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡∗) and a sequence of cooperation level 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡  for 
𝛼𝛼 ∈ �0,  𝑛𝑛2�   and 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1,2, . . }, which denotes the number of goods included in the agreement. We restrict attention to a 
symmetric and stationary tariff case, where both countries apply the identical cooperative tariff throughout the 
cooperative relationship, in order to focus on effects of cooperation level. This cooperative tariff is lower than the 
unilaterally optimal one, and can be equal to zero as well. Any particular value, however, does not have a critical 
implication for our purposes in this paper; therefore we do not specify it explicitly to avoid an unnecessary 
restriction. Stage game payoffs are defined as the sum of cooperative welfares on agreement goods and non-
cooperative welfares on non-agreement goods. The cooperative payoff of the home country in period t is: 
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) ≡ � 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛2+𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛2+𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛/2
𝑛𝑛/2
𝑛𝑛2−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛2−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡0                                           (2.4) 
Given the level of cooperation in an arbitrary period, 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 , the first term on the right hand side in equation (2.4)  
denotes the sum of the welfares from export goods that are not included in the agreement, the second term is the 
welfare from export goods that are in the agreement, the third term is the welfare from import goods in the 
agreement, and the final term is the welfare from import goods that are not included in the agreement. The identical 
structure of  demand and production across the goods in each sector enables us write this equation as  𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) ≡
�
𝑛𝑛2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡� ∙ (𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 + 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁) + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 + 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐). We will write the welfare of foreign government in a high (low) state of 
nature with an over-bar (under-bar). Figure 1 displays the payoff matrices for a bundle of goods in different states of 
nature under the agreement. 
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Low State of Nature 
 
High State of Nature 
 Betray Cooperate  Betray Cooperate 
Betray 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  Betray 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  
Cooperate 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  Cooperate 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁  𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  ,    𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  
Type 1: (𝑝𝑝1)  (1 − 𝑝𝑝1) 
Type 2: (𝑝𝑝2)  (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) 
Figure 1. Payoffs from a bundle of goods in different states of nature under an agreement 
 
In the absence of an external enforcement mechanism, we characterize a self-enforcing agreement that depends on 
credible threats of future punishments to enable cooperation in a non-cooperative environment. We assume that 
governments abrogate the agreement and permanently reverse to unilaterally optimal tariffs following a deviation by 
either country. Nash reversion strategies imply that when a government betrays by applying Nash tariffs, it prefers to 
do so in all import goods since the partner applies Nash tariffs in all goods in the punishment stage. Stage game 
payoff of the betraying foreign government in a low state of nature becomes  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) ≡ �𝑛𝑛2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡� ∙ �𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 + 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁� +
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚
𝑁𝑁 + 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐� . Since the welfare on an import good is always greater with unilaterally optimal tariffs by definition, 
the stage game payoff in a deviation period is greater than the one in a cooperative period. The payoff in the Nash 
reversion period has the lowest value among others  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗𝑁𝑁 ≡ 𝑛𝑛2 �𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 + 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁�. Payoffs of the home country are defined 
analogously. However, we introduce an assumption about unilaterally optimal tariffs. 
Assumption 1.  Foreign Nash tariffs are prohibitive.   
The reasoning behind this assumption is as follows. Foreign government’s Nash tariff changes with different 
political economy parameter values, which is bounced in variations in home government welfares on export goods. 
However, we want to restrict the mechanism through which the home government can extract signals about the type 
of foreign government in our model with one-sided incomplete information. Therefore, the practice of foreign 
government in non-agreement goods is assumed to provide no further information about its type and state of nature. 
Nevertheless, this assumption provides great simplification without changing qualitative results of our model. This 
condition is represented by identical home government Nash payoffs in export goods in Figure 1. The interaction 
between trading partners is then an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in 𝛼𝛼 non-stationary identical issues with 
stochastic payoffs in each period.  Next section characterizes the equilibrium of this relationship in the absence of 
informational asymmetries. 
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2.2. Stationary Cooperation in a Complete Information Environment 
This section introduces a benchmark case with a long-term relationship in the absence of informational asymmetry. 
We provide a non-result for the emergence of gradualism in a complete information environment. The idea here is 
that when the home government observes the probability of a shock in the foreign country, then whatever policy is 
incentive compatible for a single good is also incentive compatible for the entire import sector. The number of goods 
included in an agreement does not induce the foreign government with more or less incentives to cooperate. The 
future costs of betrayal and the current benefits from it change proportionally with scope of an agreement. Similarly, 
costs for the home government borne by the risk of foreign government betrayal rises in proportion to the rise in 
benefits from cooperation. Hence, both governments prefer cooperating at a maximum rate given that it is incentive 
compatible.    
The game starts after the realization of foreign government’s type by nature in period 0, and the home government 
proposes a contract upon observing this type. Equilibrium is characterized by an incentive compatible path of 
cooperation level and tariffs. We consider a stationary cooperation level, i.e.  𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼, ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ [1,  ∞) , to show this ex-
post. A cooperative action profile is sustainable if payoff structure does not induce the governments with a profitable 
one-shot deviation. We analyze the incentive structure of foreign government in the presence of an agreement, and 
then go back to period 0 to investigate the home government’s optimal contracting problem. We start with a type-1 
foreign government. Incentive compatibility requires that: 
(1 − 𝛿𝛿) ∙Ω𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐|𝑝𝑝1)                                                           (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐿𝐿) 
(1 − 𝛿𝛿) ∙Ω𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)                                                          (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻) 
Where Ω𝑑𝑑 ≡ 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 −𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  denotes a onetime gain from deviation on a single good in a low state of nature. Foreign 
government uses expected gain from an agreement, 𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1) ≡ (1 − 𝑝𝑝1) ∙ Ω𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝑝1 ∙ Ω𝑐𝑐 , in order to calculate the future 
payoff stream. The expected gain is a weighted sum of gains in a high state of nature  Ω𝑐𝑐 ≡ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 + 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 − 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 − 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 and in 
a low state  Ω𝑐𝑐 ≡ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 + 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 − 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 − 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁, since the states are not correlated through consecutive periods.  A notable 
aspect of these incentive constraints is the non-existence of cooperation level in the explicit formulation even though 
they denote overall payoffs. This property arises because the cooperation level appears linearly on both sides of the 
inequalities3. This shows that if a type-1 foreign government betrays (cooperates) in a complete information 
environment with a stationary cooperation level, it does so regardless of the time and cooperation level.  
                                                            
3 To see how the cooperation level is eliminated from these constraints we write them in the following way. For a type-1 foreign 
government these become 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿.𝑉𝑉∗𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝1) ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿.𝑉𝑉∗𝑁𝑁(𝑝𝑝1) in a low state and   𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿.𝑉𝑉∗𝑐𝑐�𝑝𝑝1� ≥   𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿.𝑉𝑉∗𝑁𝑁�𝑝𝑝1� in a high state. 
Here 𝑉𝑉∗𝑐𝑐  and 𝑉𝑉∗𝑁𝑁  denote the continuation values following a cooperative and non-cooperative action profile in the current 
period. Formally, 𝑉𝑉∗𝑐𝑐�𝑝𝑝1� = 1(1−𝛿𝛿) ��1 − 𝑝𝑝1�𝑤𝑤∗𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝑝1𝑤𝑤∗𝑐𝑐�, and 𝑉𝑉∗𝑁𝑁(𝑝𝑝1) = 1(1−𝛿𝛿) �(1 − 𝑝𝑝1)𝑤𝑤∗𝑁𝑁 + 𝑝𝑝1𝑤𝑤∗𝑁𝑁�. When we plug the explicit 
forms of continuation values into the constraints, cooperation levels are cancelled out since both sides contain it in multiplicative 
form.  
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We now compare the two incentive constraints in terms of strictness to show that the one in a high state of nature 
binds first. The following Lemma specifies some characteristics of complete information game regarding the payoffs 
of foreign government, which will be useful to determine the binding constraint. 
Lemma 1.  For small enough cooperative tariffs in foreign country, 
(a) Gains from  cooperative agreement decreases in political economy parameter, 𝑑𝑑Ω
𝑐𝑐
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
< 0; therefore   Ω𝑐𝑐 > Ω𝑐𝑐 , 
(b) Gains from deviation increases in political economy parameter 𝑑𝑑Ω
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
> 0; therefore  Ω𝑑𝑑 > Ω𝑑𝑑 . 
 
Using the results from Lemma 1 to evaluate the left hand side values of the incentive constraints for a type-1 foreign 
government, we see that the constraint in high state of nature binds first. Intuitively, if a type-1 foreign government 
does not betray at a time when domestic political pressures are at a peak, then it does not do so when the pressure is 
lower. Solving (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻) for the critical level of probability, we get a necessary condition for cooperation  𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1, 
where ?̂?𝑝1 = (1−𝛿𝛿)Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿Ω𝑐𝑐
𝛿𝛿� Ω𝑐𝑐−Ω𝑐𝑐�  . By Lemma 1, again, it is straightforward to show that this critical level of probability 
decreases in discount factor for high enough values. Therefore, the requirement regarding the frequency of a shock 
is stricter for relatively impatient foreign governments.  
We now describe the incentive compatibility issues for a type-2 foreign government. A type-2 foreign government 
characterizes a “risky” partner for the home government as opposed to the “safe” type-1 foreign government in our 
model.  To introduce this characteristic, we start with a key assumption that will hold throughout this paper. 
Assumption 2.    𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝2, where  𝑝𝑝2 = (1−𝛿𝛿)Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿Ω𝑐𝑐𝛿𝛿� Ω𝑐𝑐−Ω𝑐𝑐�  . 
Remember that foreign government betrays regardless of the time, if it ever does so, in a complete information 
environment with stationary cooperation levels. Assumption 2 formally specifies that a type-2 foreign government 
always betrays in a high state of nature. Hence, the realization of a political economy shock is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for a type-2 foreign government to deviate from cooperative path. The incentive constraint of a 
type-2 foreign government in a low state of nature is different than the one for type-1 in the sense that the former 
constraint incorporates possible future betrayal payoffs. Formally, 
(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝2)Ω𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ∙ �𝐸𝐸(𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝2) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) ∙ 𝛺𝛺𝑑𝑑�                                     (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿) 
which can be reduced to 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2 = Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑐𝑐+Ω𝑑𝑑�
𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐−�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐��. It is straightforward to show that for 𝛿𝛿 ≥ Ω
𝑑𝑑
�Ω
𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐� this inequality is 
satisfied trivially, and for discount rate values lower than this critical level there is no solution. These characteristics 
illustrate that for a sufficiently patient type-2 foreign government, a relationship with stationary cooperative level is 
sustainable as long as a shock does not occur. 
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In a complete information environment, the type of foreign government, the associated minimum probability that 
provides cooperation, and the actual probabilities are all common knowledge. Therefore, the home government is 
provided with the ability to tailor the agreement to maximize its expected payoffs. It is obvious that we have 
equilibria in which the foreign government betrays in the first period, and the home government does not propose 
any cooperation. These cases arise when sufficiently small probabilities violate the incentive constraints of foreign 
government, i.e.   𝑝𝑝1 < ?̂?𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2. However, we shall focus on more interesting cooperative equilibria in 
which the foreign government cooperates perpetually and the home government proposes positive cooperation level. 
Incentive compatibility condition for the home government interacting with a type-1 foreign government is: 
𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐                                                                (2.4) 
Similar to foreign government incentive constraints, this condition rules out a profitable one-shot deviation for the 
home government. In the absence of an external enforcing mechanism, the agreement proposed by the home 
government needs to be credible, i.e. the home government should have no incentive to betray. The following 
proposition provides an important result regarding the complete information case.  
Proposition 1. If incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both governments, then a trade agreement with 
maximum cooperation in all periods Pareto dominates others in a complete information environment. 
Proposition 1 shows that the home government proposes a maximum cooperation in the beginning of a relationship, 
when incentive constraints are satisfied. Using this result to define the cooperative continuation value on the right 
hand side, we get 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼),∞𝑖𝑖=0  where 𝛼𝛼 denotes the maximum cooperation level. Therefore, inequality (2.4) 
can be reduced to 𝛿𝛿 ≥ Ω
𝑑𝑑
�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐� . When  𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1and home government is patient enough, cooperation starts at 
maximum level and is sustained afterwards. If foreign government is known to be type-2, then home government 
needs to incorporate the probability of high state of nature into account, since the foreign government betrays in that 
case. Incentive constraint for the home government becomes: 
𝑝𝑝2𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 ≤ 𝑝𝑝2[𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐] + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)[𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]            (2.5) 
Using the result from proposition 1, we get 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = 11−𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝2 �𝑝𝑝2𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿(1−𝑝𝑝2)1−𝛿𝛿 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁�, which involves the 
risk of being betrayed in each period. Plugging this in (2.5) and solving for the minimum discount factor that 
satisfies the incentive constraint, we get 𝛿𝛿 ≥ Ω𝑑𝑑
𝑝𝑝22�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐�  , which can be shown to be greater than the value in case of a 
type-1 foreign government. Therefore, there exists an interval of discount factor values where home government 
cooperates only with a type-1 foreign government. The greater is the probability of getting a low state of nature for a 
type-2 government, the more patient home government needs to be to propose full cooperation in complete 
information case.  
This result shows that cooperation level proposed in a complete information trade agreement is given by the 
following conditions: 
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∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ [1,  ∞),       𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝛼𝛼                 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1 ,𝛿𝛿 ≥ 𝛺𝛺𝑑𝑑(𝛺𝛺𝑑𝑑 + 𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐)     𝛼𝛼                  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡2 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2 ,𝛿𝛿 ≥ 𝛺𝛺𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝22(𝛺𝛺𝑑𝑑 + 𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐)0                  𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡                                                         
                                 (2.6)  
As a result, given that the probabilities of a shock are low enough to provide cooperation for both types of the 
foreign government, home government employs its privilege to design a contract in order to implement the optimal 
level of cooperation immediately in the absence of informational asymmetry in our model. Home government’s 
incentive constraints do not face dynamic changes since there is no update in the state variables of maximization 
problem. Therefore, the optimal cooperation does not exhibit a gradual path.  Stochastic states of nature do not 
contribute much to the analysis besides changing it from an interim maximization to an ex-ante maximization 
problem for home government.  
Our result for the complete information case is analogous to the findings reported in the linkage literature. We model 
identical structure in demand and supply conditions. Combined with the assumption of identical tariffs across the 
goods within an import sector, the degree of enforcement is also identical across the bundle of goods in an 
agreement. This shows that there is no slack enforcement power that could be transferred to other goods through 
linking separate agreements. Therefore, whatever is enforceable for a single bundle is also enforceable for the entire 
sector.  This result holds both for the static and incremental linkage story. We now focus on our gradualism results 
and condition that give rise to them. 
3. Non-Stationary Cooperation under Incomplete Information 
In this section we solve an infinitely repeated game with stochastic states of nature and one-sided incomplete 
information. We assume that state of nature in each period and type of foreign government are privately observed by 
the foreign government. However, the prior probability of foreign government being type-1 (𝜇𝜇0) and type-2 (1 − 𝜇𝜇0) 
are common knowledge, where  𝜇𝜇0 ∈ (0,1). Probabilities of low and high states of nature conditional on foreign 
government’s type are identical with complete information scenario. Game follows the identical path described in 
previous section4. 
                                                            
4 To put this environment in perspective, note that it is similar to a two-type screening model and repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game. However, there are both static and dynamic differences.  In a standard principal-agent framework, the “good” type agent 
(efficient or low cost) has an incentive to imitate the “bad” type (inefficient or high cost), which instigates the principal to 
decrease transaction with the latter one to reduce the information rent extracted by the former type. The ability of principal to 
propose a menu of contracts with respective transfers assures this result. On the other hand, the agency problem therefore optimal 
contracting issue is ignored in a standard repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Our model unifies these two environments in the 
sense that we have payoff structure of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with agency problem. The good type agent (type-1 
foreign government) is the one who pays for its inability to reveal its type, whereas the bad type agent (type-2 foreign 
government) extracts information rent. The principal (home government) is constraint to propose a single contract that specifies a 
unique cooperation level.  
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Given incomplete information structure, home government faces the problem of choosing an optimal cooperation 
path {𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞  that maximizes welfare. Remember that home government observes only actions of the foreign 
government in each period. Let  {𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞  be the sequence of the probabilities home government assigns to the event 
foreign government being type-1 in respective periods. Each 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  denotes the posterior belief upon observing the 
foreign government’s action in period (𝑡𝑡 − 1), and is used to construct expectations for period 𝑡𝑡 and afterwards. 
This belief evolves in a Bayesian fashion, formally: 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1 ≡ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 [𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝2]⁄                                                                    (3.1) 
In order to define this posterior probability in terms of the prior belief, 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜 , we iterate it: 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇0 [𝜇𝜇0 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇0)(𝑝𝑝2)𝑡𝑡−1]⁄                                                                 (3.2) 
Only exception is the first period, where there is no new information available before players move, hence home 
government uses the prior belief 𝜇𝜇1 = 𝜇𝜇0. It is obvious that after enough periods of successful cooperation this belief 
converges to one,  lim𝑡𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = 1.  We define the home government’s belief of foreign government acting 
cooperatively in current period by 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 . This probability is composed of probability of the foreign government to be a 
type-1, and probability of nature choosing a low state if it is type-2. This corresponds to home government’s 
subjective belief of not getting a type-2 foreign government with a high-state of nature. Formally, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +(1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝2. Iterating this, we get the subjective probability of foreign government cooperating in 𝑘𝑘’th period after 
period 𝑡𝑡, given that it cooperates in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1: 
�𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖 =𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=0 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡)(𝑝𝑝2)𝑘𝑘+1                                                                (3.3) 
Cooperation levels specified in the contract for each period and belief sequence, together with governments’ 
strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if: Foreign government’s actions are optimal given the cooperation 
level in each period; home government’s actions are optimal given its posterior beliefs and subsequent strategies in 
each period; and the posterior belief is derived from the prior, foreign government’s strategy and observed action 
profile. These conditions require that governments act optimally at any point in history of the game.  Self-enforcing 
character of the agreement eliminates commitment concerns, yet following Laffont and Tirole (1990) we assume 
that the initial contract is designed to incorporate additional information. Intuitively, Bayesian updating mechanism 
alters home government’s incentive scheme after each period, relaxing the incentive constraint and providing further 
cooperation. Both types of foreign government receive higher payoffs with higher cooperation, therefore 
renegotiation is allowed. However, without loss of generality, the original contract is designed to avoid future 
renegotiation.  
We can now characterize the incentive structure of foreign government. Incentive constraints for different types of 
foreign government differ from complete information case due to non-stationary character of cooperation level 
through consecutive periods. Remember that in a complete information case, where cooperation is stationary, net 
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balance of discounted gains and punishments is the single factor that provides the foreign government with the 
incentive to act cooperatively or not. Therefore this incentive form is also stationary throughout the game. On the 
contrary, in an incomplete information game we have inter-temporal incentives in addition to static balance of one 
period gains and punishments. An expected augmentation in stage game cooperative payoff in the future due to 
rising level of cooperation provides an additional incentive for the foreign government to cooperate in the current 
period. Therefore, postponing betrayal becomes profitable if cooperation level increases fast enough to more than 
compensate the time discounting.  
We start with a type-1 foreign government. As we mentioned in previous section, we assume that this type of 
foreign government cooperates perpetually throughout the game. And as in the previous section, the incentive 
constraint for this type binds in a high state of nature. Formally: 
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ∙Ω
𝑑𝑑
≤ 𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐|𝑝𝑝1) ∙ � 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∞
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡+1                                                    (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻)′ 
Intuitively, this condition states that discounted sum of expected future gains from an agreement, which is 
contingent on probabilities of different state of natures and the increasing level of cooperation, should be at least as 
large as benefit from betraying in current period, which is a function of current cooperation level. This condition 
would be null had the cooperation level could grow infinitely in the future. But existence of an upper bound implies 
a structural change in above mentioned condition once the maximum level of cooperation is reached. Solving this 
incentive constraint, we get the condition for perpetual cooperation once the maximum cooperation level is attained,   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1, which is identical with complete information case. 
Solution for a type-2 foreign government incorporates the fact that it always betrays in a high state of nature. The 
incentive constraint for this type in a low state of nature reflects this effect through the alteration in cooperative 
continuation values. Formally:  
� (𝑝𝑝2𝛿𝛿)𝑖𝑖−(𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖∞
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐|𝑝𝑝2) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) ∙Ω𝑑𝑑�  ≥ 1𝛿𝛿 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡Ω𝑑𝑑                         (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿)′ 
Intuitively, current cooperative behavior is conditioned on comparison between discounted future gains from 
agreement with a possible gain from betrayal, and current net benefit of betraying. The left hand-side incorporates 
the intertemporal gains due to non-stationary level of cooperation.  The condition under which type-2 foreign 
government cooperates perpetually once the maximum level of cooperation is reached is found analogously, and 
identical to the one in complete information section: 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2.  We next focus on pooling and separating equilibria. 
3.1. Gradualism in Cooperation 
Suppose  𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2, so that both types of foreign government cooperates perpetually once maximum 
level of cooperation is attained. Then we get the following result. 
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Lemma 2.  If   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2, then both (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻)′ and (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿)′  do not bind unless the cooperation level 
decreases sufficiently within time. 
Intuitively, Lemma 2 implies that home government can only extract “weak” signals from foreign government’s 
cooperative actions. Revelation of foreign government’s type in pooling equilibrium occurs only when betrayal is 
observed, which is reserved for type-2 foreign government in high state of nature. Nevertheless, home government’s 
subjective belief about foreign government being type-1 increases gradually as cooperative action profile is 
observed through periods. A self-enforcing agreement requires incentive compatibility for home government as 
well. Formally in period 𝑡𝑡: 
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ∙ [𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1)] + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁] ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁, 
Plugging the explicit payoffs in, we get: 
  𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡[𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁] ≥ 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 −𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐)                                              (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐻𝐻)                                                  
Nash cooperation value is deterministic and defined as discounted sum of payoff stream when unilaterally optimal 
tariffs are applied. Cooperative continuation value for the decision maker in period 𝑡𝑡 is formally defined as: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ [𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+2)] + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]                     (3.4) 
Therefore, we have a recursive structure in cooperation values. There are two features that worth pointing out here: 
First, there is more than one (two, specifically) non-stationary variables, the belief q and cooperation level 𝛼𝛼. 
Second, both of these non-stationary variables are bounded above: i.e. the belief has an upper limit of one, and level 
of cooperation is limited by amount of goods traded between countries. However, although the upper limit is 
reached for latter one in the course of game, as we will show it, upper limit for belief is never attained in a pooling 
equilibrium. We take advantage of this structural change by defining the critical period in which cooperation level 
reaches to its maximal level, and analyze rest of the game with reference to that period in proof of Lemma 3. We 
call the subsection of long-term relationship where level of cooperation is stationary at the maximum level 
“maximum cooperation phase”, and the subsection where cooperation level rises gradually “gradual cooperation 
phase”. First we define a general form for continuation value at an arbitrary point in time, without signifying the 
structural break point. Solving (3.4) iteratively, we get this general form: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) = �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡�𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]��𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡
∞
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡                               (3.5) 
Intuitively, let 𝑡𝑡 be the first period with maximum level of cooperation, then continuation value in period 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘 is the 
discounted sum of expected payoffs from cooperation in both phases. Expected stage game payoffs increase in 
gradual cooperation phase as long as governments act cooperatively. This is determined by both non-stationary 
variables we mentioned. Holding cooperation level constant, expectation of future payoffs increase solely because 
home government assigns a higher probability to foreign government acting favorably in the future. This “pure 
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belief effect” manipulates the continuation values in both phases of the relationship. Given a higher probability of 
favorable play in the future, home governments’ incentive constraint is relaxed after a cooperative period. This 
slackness provides some room for further cooperation that makes the incentive constraint bind again. Therefore the 
continuation value increases due to these two effects after each successfully cooperative action profile in gradual 
cooperation phase. Following lemma summarizes these findings. 
Lemma 3. 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) > 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) for the home government due to: 
i. 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  and 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡  in gradual cooperation phase 
ii.  𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  in maximum cooperation phase (pure belief effect) 
We now technically show that cooperation level increases in the first phase. Home government can increase its 
expected payoff by increasing the level of cooperation when there is slackness in its incentive constraint. Therefore, 
optimality requires the incentive constraint to bind in every period in gradual cooperation phase. Using (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐻𝐻), 
the level of cooperation that satisfies the incentive constraint with equality can be written as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 −𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 [𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]                                                                (3.6) 
Since 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+2) > 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) by Lemma 3 and 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  by definition of 𝑞𝑞 and (3.2), we show that 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 . 
Following proposition specifies our main result regarding gradualism. 
Proposition 2. By Lemmas 2 and 3, and using (3.6) the optimal contract proposes a gradual transition to maximum 
cooperation phase in a pooling equilibrium where  𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 ≥  ?̂?𝑝2 . 
In order to derive the optimal cooperation explicitly, we employ two characteristics of the game: Home government 
selects the highest possible cooperation level that ex-ante satisfies its incentive constraint based on the subjective 
belief in each period5. This implies that home government is indifferent between betraying and cooperating in each 
period. Moreover, being indifferent between cooperation and betrayal in two consecutive periods implies being 
indifferent between betraying in the first period and cooperating in the first but betraying in the second period6.  We 
take advantage of this property to characterize the optimal increment in level of cooperation. In an arbitrary period t 
we formally show this as: 
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡)𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁  =  𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡�𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿[𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1)𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]� 
                                                            
5 Otherwise, it could increase the cooperation level and get a higher payoff without violating incentive constraints of foreign 
government, which contradicts with optimality condition. 
6 A simple example helps elaborate this. Assume there is a two period game with discounting (discount factor 𝛿𝛿) where a player 
faces the problem of choosing between left (L) and right (R) in both periods. In the first period, L ends the game, whereas R starts 
the second period. Choosing L and R gives the same payoff in the second period, call this 𝜋𝜋. In order for the player to be 
indifferent between L and R in the first period, L needs to earn him 𝜁𝜁 + 𝛿𝛿𝜋𝜋 whereas R gives 𝜁𝜁 plus the discounted payoff from 
second period. In this case, strategies of playing L in the first period and R in the first period and L in the second period both 
earns him 𝜁𝜁 + 𝛿𝛿𝜋𝜋. 
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                                                            + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁] 
Where the left hand side shows the home government’s payoff on deviation, including possibility of foreign 
government betraying simultaneously. The right hand side describes the payoff generated by cooperation in current 
period and betrayal in next one, with the payoffs associated with possible betrayal by foreign country in current 
period or the next one. Plugging definitions of welfares in, and employing gains from actions notation, we get the 
explicit correlation between two consecutive cooperation levels: 
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 𝛿𝛿[Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐]Ω𝑑𝑑                                                               (3.7) 
Note that this relationship is relevant only in gradual cooperation phase. Once the maximum level of cooperation is 
attained, additional beliefs favoring cooperation only increases expected future payoffs slightly. However, this 
correlation gives us a well-defined path of optimal cooperation until it reaches a maximum. Setting 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼, (3.9) gives us the level of belief sufficient to reach maximum cooperation: 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝22�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐�𝛿𝛿(1−𝑝𝑝22)∙(Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐) . It is immediate that 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  
decreases in 𝑝𝑝2. Therefore, the smaller is probability of type-2 foreign government experiencing a political economy 
shock, the faster maximum cooperation is reached in a pooling equilibrium.  
3.2. Bicycle Theory and “Testing” the Foreign Government 
Both types of foreign government stay in cooperative relationship unless a shock is realized, and this is common 
knowledge in pooling case described in previous section. Therefore, home government does not need to provide 
intertemporal incentives to keep foreign government in the relationship. We now investigate a case where current 
degree of liberalization is not enforceable without further liberalization in the future.  
Suppose   𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2, so that type-2 foreign government betrays in case of maximum cooperation even in low state of 
nature. Hence type-2 foreign government betrays whenever the cooperation level remains stationary for the rest of 
the game. This characteristic changes the structure of cooperation dramatically. If home government wants to keep a 
type-2 foreign government in cooperative relationship, then it needs to provide sufficient intertemporal incentives. 
Increasing the cooperation level through consecutive periods postpones foreign government’s betrayal, but never 
eliminates it since the level function is bounded above. We start by deriving the cooperative path that provides 
intertemporal incentives and make type-2 foreign government delay betrayal. The condition   𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2 implies that 
there is no cooperative continuation value in period 𝑡𝑡, where the level of cooperation is supposed to reach a 
maximum level. We can write down the incentive constraint of a type-2 foreign government in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 as: 
𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿�𝑝𝑝2𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁� 
Solving this, we get the maximum value of cooperation level that makes type-2 foreign government indifferent 
between betraying in periods 𝑡𝑡 − 1  and 𝑡𝑡 :  𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 =  𝛼𝛼Ω𝑑𝑑 𝛿𝛿 �𝑝𝑝2�Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) ∙ �Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐��. It is straightforward to 
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show that  𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 < 𝛼𝛼. Manipulating   𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2, the term inside the brackets becomes smaller than one. Solving for the 
maximum incentive compatible levels of cooperation backwards, we get a general rule for an arbitrary period: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 �𝛿𝛿 𝑝𝑝2�Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) ∙ �Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐�
Ω𝑑𝑑
�
𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖                                          (3.8) 
This rule defines a convex path increasing in time. Intuitively, it represents the required increment in cooperation 
level that makes foreign government indifferent between betraying in an arbitrary period and postponing it for the 
next one.  Following lemma summarizes our result evidencing the bicycle effect. 
Lemma 4. If   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1  and  𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2, then current cooperation at any point in time cannot be sustained unless 
cooperation level increases sufficiently:   𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
≥
Ω𝑑𝑑
𝛿𝛿�𝑝𝑝2�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐�+�1−𝑝𝑝2�∙�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐�� > 1 . 
It is straightforward to see that this requirement is decreasing in discount factor. A smaller augmentation in 
cooperation level is required to sustain cooperation with more patient foreign governments. As cooperation level is 
bounded above, this implies that relationship can last longer since future prospects will be depleted rather slowly in 
case of a more patient foreign government.  
Terminating the relationship is as interesting as its evolution. Under the conditions   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1  and    𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2, this is 
not trivial. Home government takes advantage of additional information revealed in each period to redesign the 
contract7. It follows from this fact and Proposition 1 that after a critical period, where types are separated since type-
2 betrays, governments cooperate at a maximum level if partnership does not end. However, this raises issues 
concerning the “ratchet effect”. Observing the proposed cooperation path, type-2 foreign government can gain 
substantially by pooling with a type-1 foreign government in the separation period. Postponing betrayal one more 
period provides it with betrayal payoff in maximum cooperation stage. This effect makes separation of types more 
costly for home government, since it needs to provide more incentives to induce trading partner reveal its type8. 
Specifically, the minimum cooperation level that separates the types is 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 . 
We now characterize the conditions under which testing is incentive compatible with home government. We start 
with a special case where home government tests the foreign government in the beginning of relationship. Expected 
payoff from a credible-test strategy for the home government in an arbitrary is given by: 
𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜[𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼)] + (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]                                        (3.9) 
                                                            
7 Assuming contract being designed at the outset of the game does not change this property. The initial contract conditions the 
path of cooperation on observed action profile in each period. 
8 We do not have further complications related with the good type partner in our model. A good type agent might “take-the-
money-and-run” when principal raises incentives to separate types in a standard dynamic principal agent framework. This might 
make the incentive constraints bind both ‘upward” and “downward”. Since a type-1 foreign government prefers perpetual 
cooperation we do not need to worry about this. 
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This is basically a weighted sum of expected payoffs when foreign country is type-1 (cooperates) and type-2 
(betrays) using the corresponding belief. Note that cooperative continuation value in a separating equilibrium is 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼) = ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼)∞𝑖𝑖=𝑜𝑜  since home government’s posterior belief is equal to one after this period. It is obvious that (3.9) is increasing in prior belief 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜 . The more likely is foreign government a good partner, the higher is expected 
payoff from a testing strategy. Home government’s incentive constraint completes the analysis for a condition under 
which testing is an equilibrium strategy: 
𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜[𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼)] + (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜) ∙ [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]   
    ≥ 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜[𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁] + (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜) ∙ [𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]                     (3.10) 
Intuitively, (3.10) claims credibility. Home government should not have any incentive to betray in testing period 
once it proposes that in the initial agreement. This condition reduces to 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜 𝛿𝛿1−𝛿𝛿 𝛼𝛼Ω𝑐𝑐 − 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1Ω𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0. Plugging the 
value of 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 we displayed before and solving for 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜  we get:  
𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜 ≥ (1 − 𝛿𝛿)Ω𝑑𝑑Ω𝑐𝑐 ∙ �𝑝𝑝2�Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2) ∙ �Ω𝑑𝑑 + Ω𝑐𝑐�Ω𝑑𝑑 � = 𝜇𝜇0                             (3.11) 
Figure 2 displays two cases for testing strategies in the beginning of relationship. Left panel shows ratchet effect 
baffling a non-credible test; whereas the right panel shows a successful separation in the first period of relationship. 
Note that if home government could fully commit to the gradual path –bold concave curve in panel a-, then a small 
deviation from incentive compatible path for type-2 foreign government would successfully separate the types. 
However, in the absence of full commitment, ex-post efficiency through renegotiation upon complete revelation of 
types requires a higher initial incentive to implement separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛼𝛼 
𝛼𝛼   
𝑡𝑡   
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻)  
 
(a)  A Non-credible “Test” 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿)  
 
𝛼𝛼 
𝑡𝑡   
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻)  
 
(b)  A Credible “Test” 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿)  
 
Figure 2.  Incentive Structure and Testing in Separating Equilibrium 
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Following proposition summarizes conditions for the existence of this separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 3. Given   𝑝𝑝1 ≥ ?̂?𝑝1,   𝑝𝑝2 <  ?̂?𝑝2 and 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜 ≥ 𝜇𝜇0, there exists a separating equilibrium where home 
government proposes 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 and  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼  ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ≥ 2  conditional on cooperative action in the first period. 
Therefore the type of foreign government is revealed in the first period, and cooperation continues with maximum 
level from second period onward if the foreign government does not betray in the first period. 
Corollary.  𝜇𝜇0 is decreasing in 𝛿𝛿. 
Result by corollary is interesting in the sense that it shows more patient governments are more likely to resolve 
uncertainties arising from informational asymmetry in the beginning of a relationship by eliminating bad type 
partners. Intuitively, gradual adjustment enables cooperation but at the same time some payoff is lost due to 
postponed maximum cooperation. Therefore, higher discount factor increases the discounted value of this additional 
payoff that can be earned by maximizing cooperation quickly. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper helps understand the structure of cooperation between countries in the presence of informational 
asymmetry. In the absence of incomplete information, home government observes the probability of foreign 
government to experience political economy shocks in the form of protectionism in each period. Given that this 
probability is low enough to satisfy foreign government’s incentive constraint, and that home government is patient 
enough, partners start the relationship with maximum cooperation. We show that home government needs to be 
more patient for partnership to be sustainable, when this probability is relatively high. Nevertheless, cooperation 
does not exhibit dynamic variation in a complete information environment. 
Non-stationary cooperation emerges when foreign government’s probability of experiencing political economy 
shock is privately observed. We consider a case where foreign government betrays perpetually with or without 
political economy shock realization if probability of shock is relatively small. However, it prefers betraying when 
political economy shock is realized if this probability is relatively high. Home government hesitates to start 
cooperation at a maximum level in this case. Using the privilege to design the contract, it proposes gradually 
increasing cooperation level conditional on cooperative action profiles. Home government becomes more optimistic 
about its partner as it cooperates through periods.  We show that the threshold level of belief sufficient for home 
government to propose maximum cooperation is increasing in the probability of shock. Hence, maximum 
cooperation is attained faster with low probability of shock. 
We next consider a case where foreign government prefers betraying even before a shock is realized when 
probability of political economy shock is high enough. In this case, home government needs to provide this type of 
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foreign government with sufficient intertemporal incentives to keep it in partnership. This is satisfied by increasing 
the level of cooperation. We show that this necessary increment is decreasing in discount factor: More patient 
governments can sustain a longer cooperative relationship as long as a shock is not realized. Home government 
might prefer “testing” the trading-partner in the beginning of relationship by proposing a high enough cooperation 
level that violates foreign government’s incentive constraint if it has a high probability of shock. Interestingly, we 
see that the minimum prior belief that makes this testing attainable is decreasing in discount factor. The more patient 
is home government, the more likely it prefers resolving uncertainty in the beginning of relationship by rectifying 
the “bad” type partner. 
A potential limitation of our analysis is its inability to refer sector-based composition of agreement under different 
supply schemes. We believe that non-uniform and non-asymmetric conditions in different sectors may provide 
significant enrichment for analysis of trade agreements. We also believe that further work is needed to understand 
optimal dynamic behavior of governments under asymmetric information. 
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Appendices 
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1 
Substituting the market clearing prices in (2.3) and differentiating it with respect to 𝜏𝜏∗ we obtain the Nash tariff of foreign 
country as a function of political economy parameter  𝜏𝜏∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾). Using this Nash tariff and market clearing price, the Nash welfare 
on an import good becomes:  
𝑊𝑊∗�𝑃𝑃�∗,𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤� = 𝑚𝑚∗𝑁𝑁 = 12 �𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾)  )�2 + 𝑎𝑎∗2 𝛾𝛾�𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾)  )�2 + 𝜏𝜏∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾)   ∙ �𝑀𝑀∗ �𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏∗𝑁𝑁(𝛾𝛾)  )�� 
Whereas the cooperative welfare on an import good is defined as: 
𝑊𝑊∗�𝑃𝑃�∗,𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤� = 𝑚𝑚∗𝑐𝑐 = 12 �𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)�2 + 𝑎𝑎∗2 𝛾𝛾�𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)�2 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 ∙ �𝑀𝑀∗ �𝑃𝑃�∗(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)�� 
Welfares of foreign country on export goods with Nash tariff and cooperative tariff are: 
𝑊𝑊∗(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤) = 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁 = 12 [𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤(𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁)]2 + 𝑎𝑎∗2 [𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤(𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁)]2  and   𝑊𝑊∗(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤) = 𝑥𝑥∗𝑐𝑐 = 12 [𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)]2 + 𝑎𝑎∗2 [𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)]2   
The results from Lemma 1 follow immediately from differentiating Ω𝑐𝑐 = 𝑚𝑚∗𝑐𝑐 + 𝑥𝑥∗𝑐𝑐 − 𝑚𝑚∗𝑁𝑁 − 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁 and Ω𝑑𝑑 = 𝑚𝑚∗𝑁𝑁 − 𝑚𝑚∗𝑐𝑐  with 
respect to 𝛾𝛾.         ∎ 
 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2 
We prove this by showing that the paths that make type-1 and type-2 indifferent between cooperating and betraying in 
consecutive periods is necessarily downward sloping in a pooling equilibrium case. Suppose the condition 𝑝𝑝1 ≥  𝑝𝑝�1 =(1−𝛿𝛿)∙Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿∙Ω𝑐𝑐
𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑐𝑐−Ω
𝑐𝑐
�
 holds for type-1 foreign government in a high state of nature. We assume 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 > 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  ,∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, ?̂?𝑡 − 1] , to show this 
cannot be correct. We solve the cooperation level values that satisfy (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 1𝐻𝐻)  with equality backward from period ?̂?𝑡: 
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝛼 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)
Ω
𝑑𝑑 𝛿𝛿� ∙ �
11 − 𝛿𝛿� ∙ �𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)Ω𝑑𝑑 + 1��0 
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡−2 = 𝛼𝛼 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)
Ω
𝑑𝑑 𝛿𝛿� ∙ �
11−𝛿𝛿� ∙ �𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)Ω𝑑𝑑 + 1��1 , … 
This pattern gives us the borderline path of incentive compatibility for cooperation level:        
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)
Ω
𝑑𝑑 𝛿𝛿� ∙ �
11 − 𝛿𝛿� ∙ �𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)Ω𝑑𝑑 + 1��𝑡𝑡−(𝑖𝑖+1)                                                  (𝐴𝐴. 1) 
Now, find the condition that satisfies  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
> 1 ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, ?̂?𝑡 − 1], using (𝐴𝐴. 1) we get  𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝1)
Ω
𝑑𝑑 + 1� < 1 . However, plugging in 
the values of expectation and solving for 𝑝𝑝1, we get: 𝑝𝑝1 < (1−𝛿𝛿)∙Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿∙Ω𝑐𝑐
𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑐𝑐−Ω
𝑐𝑐
�
  , which contradicts with our initial assumption.  
The part for type-2 foreign government is identical with the type-1 case. However, the expected future gain from betraying is 
included in the analysis. The path defines the sequence of cooperation levels that satisfy (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 2𝐿𝐿) is: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝2) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)Ω𝑑𝑑Ω𝑑𝑑 𝛿𝛿� ∙ � 11 − 𝑝𝑝2𝛿𝛿� ∙ �𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝2) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝2)Ω𝑑𝑑Ω𝑑𝑑 + 1��
𝑡𝑡−(𝑖𝑖+1)                      (A. 2) 
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And the necessary condition for an increasing level of cooperation, 𝛿𝛿 �𝐸𝐸(Ω𝑐𝑐 |𝑝𝑝2)+(1−𝑝𝑝2)Ω𝑑𝑑
Ω𝑑𝑑
+ 1� < 1 contradicts with our initial 
assumption  𝑝𝑝2 ≥  𝑝𝑝�2 = Ω𝑑𝑑−𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑐𝑐+Ω𝑑𝑑�
𝛿𝛿�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐−�Ω𝑑𝑑+Ω𝑐𝑐��  .                   ∎ 
 
A.4. Proof of Lemma 3 
Suppose 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼  ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡  and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼  ∀ 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡 . Let the periods 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡  be maximum cooperation phase. The only non-stationary 
variable in this phase is the belief of the home government about the foreign governments’ cooperation. Therefore, we can easily 
write a general rule for continuation values in this phase: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡� = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼)�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡 + [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]
∞
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡 �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡 �
1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
�
∞
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡                              (𝐴𝐴. 3) 
Note that this continuation value increases in q. Remembering 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  as long as the foreign government does not betray, we 
can show this as follows: For an arbitrary  𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡 , the first term on the right hand side of (3.5) increases in 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  obviously. In order 
to see that the second term also increases, we write down the explicit form of it: (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡[(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+2) … ] 
But, the recursive term in the brackets is the second component of 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1).  Let ,  
𝑍𝑍 = [𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁]�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖+1
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖+1 �
∞
𝑖𝑖=0 �𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=0  
Then the second component of  𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡)  becomes (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍 , which is smaller than 𝑍𝑍. To see this we use   lim𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡→1[(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍] = 𝛿𝛿𝑍𝑍  < 𝑍𝑍. This completes the case for maximum cooperation phase. 
Let periods 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑡𝑡 be gradual cooperation phase. We define the continuation values in this phase with reference to the first 
continuation value of the maximum cooperation phase, 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡� . Solving for continuation values backwards starting from period 
𝑡𝑡, we get a general rule for continuation values in gradual cooperation phase with reference to 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡�: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) = �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡 +𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡  �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡[𝑤𝑤−𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁] ∙ �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ��𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡��𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1𝑗𝑗=𝑡𝑡                (𝐴𝐴. 4) 
Comparing the explicit forms, one can easily show that 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1) and 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) are infinite sequences with the former having 
greater value in each period due to higher beliefs and cooperation levels. Therefore, discounted sum of a sequence of values that 
is greater in each period compared to another sequence is also greater than the discounted some of the latter.         ∎ 
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